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Abstract
The link between the mortality and epidemiological transitions is used to identify the
effect of the former on the fertility transition: a mortality transition that is not accompa-
nied by improvingmorbidity causes slower demographic and economic change. In amodel
where children may die from infectious disease, childhood health affects human capital
and noninfectious-disease-related adult mortality. When child mortality falls from lower
prevalence, as it did in western Europe, labor productivity improves, fertility falls and the
economy prospers. When it falls mainly from better cures, as it has in sub-Saharan Africa,
survivors are less healthy and there is little economic growth. Themodel can quantitatively
explain sub-Saharan Africa’s experience. More generally it shows that the commonly used
indicator, life expectancy at birth, is a poor predictor of population health and economic
growth unless morbidity falls with mortality.
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1 Introduction
A leading view of the demographic transition links the fertility transition to prior reductions of
child mortality. This pattern fits well several early industrializers of the nineteenth century and
most developing countries in the twentieth century. Sub-Saharan Africa has been an exception
to the pattern: despite significant improvement in child mortality, its fertility transition has
beenmarkedly slower thanwhatwe have come to expect fromcompleted transitions elsewhere.
We argue that the health of Africa’s population has improvedmuch less than improvements
in child mortality or life expectancy at birth suggest and this is why its fertility transition has
been slower, yielded little economic benefit. Our explanation draws on the twin transitions
of mortality and morbidity. During the epidemiological transition that underlies the mortality
transition, infectious disease mortality among the young and elderly falls, followed by non-
infectious disease mortality among older adults (Omran, 1971). Furthermore, falling infec-
tious disease mortality is typically associated with falling morbidity as younger adults become
healthier and fewer older adults suffer from non-infectious disease. It is this link betweenmor-
tality and morbidity that has weakened during sub-Saharan Africa’s mortality transition.
We develop a general equilibrium dynastic model that qualitatively and quantitatively ac-
counts for sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic and disease transitions. In the model, infectious
disease affects susceptible children some ofwhomdie. The health of surviving children is weak-
ened, lowering the return on their human capital investment. Childhood infections also predis-
pose people towards non-communicable illnesses like cardiovascular disease (CVD) later in life.
The attendant childhoodmorbidity and adult mortality affect the value parents place on family
size relative to child quality and their own future needs.
We differentiate between two ways child mortality can decline, from lower infectious dis-
ease prevalence or better therapy that attenuates infections.1 Falling prevalence was behind
the West’s mortality transition and morbidity declined in tandem: child survival gains in late
nineteenth century England and Wales were followed by secular gains in adult stature in suc-
cessive cohorts (Szreter, 1988, Hinde, 2003, Arora, 2005, Bozzoli et al., 2009). African countries,
on the other hand, have reduced child mortality through better treatments like antibiotics and
ORT (Guerrant et al., 2003, Boschi-Pinto et al., 2006). While vaccination has eradicated diseases
like smallpox and polio, those have been the exceptions. This means decades of falling child
mortality have not substantially lowered the prevalence of major infectious diseases in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). Unlike other developing regions, adult stature and non-infectious disease
mortality have improved little (Akachi and Canning, 2010, Leeder et al., 2003).
1This distinction is made for conceptual clarity. While some therapeutic treatments can lower prevalence by
reducing contagion, that effect is typically second-order. See also footnote 14.
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In the model when child mortality falls from lower prevalence, more surviving children are
of better quality (health), which raises the return to investing in their education as long as rear-
ing sick children is not too time intensive. Altruistic parents substitute toward child quality; the
total and net fertility rates fall. Since fewer children suffer from infections in early life, as adults
they face a lower risk of premature death from CVDs. This further lowers the fertility rate and
raises investment in physical capital. These forces facilitate epidemiological, demographic and
economic transitions.
When child mortality falls from better cures, on the other hand, that they suffered through
repeated infections means more surviving children are of worse quality. Parents have little in-
centive to invest in their human capital, and continue to choose large families. While the total
fertility rate falls, net fertility may not. Moreover, due to infections in early life, a large share
of the adult population is exposed to CVD-related premature mortality. The fertility or epi-
demiological transitions are slower in this case. Economic growth may even worsen if the mor-
bidity effect is particularly severe. Calibrations of the model mimic the mortality transition in
SSA versus the historical experience of England & Wales. The initial exogenous trigger for the
CMR decline, lower disease transmission versus lower case fatalities, takes the economy from
a Malthusian regime to modern growth and determines the path of mortality and population
health. We show that the morbidity channel can account for the African experience and that
child mortality alone is a poor predictor of national health and development.
Changes in child mortality, life expectancy at birth, adult mortality and health have been
favorably linked in the literature to fertility behavior, human capital investment and growth.2
Conversely, some newer papers, notably Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), question if the rela-
tionship between life expectancy at birth and economic development is strong or even posi-
tive. Acemoglu and Johnson, in particular, construct instruments for life expectancy changes
using global public health interventions based on antibiotics (penicillin and others), some vac-
cines, and DDT. While DDT falls in the prevention category, the authors show that removing
malaria from consideration does not substantially change the predicted life expectancy im-
provements. They also point out that the two main killers at the time were TB and pneumonia,
both treated with antibiotics. Therefore Acemoglu and Johnson’s work primarily demonstrates
that treatment-based interventions increased population growth.
Similarly, Hansen’s (2014) work finds that the sharpmortality decline in mid-twentieth cen-
tury US did not lead to slower population growth. The author measures the effect of life ex-
2For example, see Bleakley and Lange (2009) and Fogel (1996) for country-specific evidence, Bleakley (2010)
and Lorentzen et al (2008) for cross-country evidence. On the theoretical side, Bar and Leukhina (2010), Boldrin
and Jones (2002), Cervellati and Sunde (2011), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Lagerlöf (2003), Soares (2005) and Strulik and
Weisdorf (2014) are but a few of the recent contributions on the mortality-fertility link. Schultz (1997) provides a
review of the earlier literature.
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pectancy improvements causedprimarily by antibiotics, focusing on the treatment-basedphase
of themortality decline compared to the nineteenth century’s prevention-based decline (Cutler
et al., 2006). Both paper’s findings are consistent with our theoretical predictions of the effect of
treatment-based mortality reduction on population growth and economic development. Fur-
thermore, our work cautions against the use of mortality alone to gauge the relationship be-
tween population health and economic development.3
This paper deepens our understanding of the demographic transition based on several re-
cent papers. Doepke (2005) points out that under CRRA preferences and certainty, improving
child survival lowers the total fertility rate but leaves net fertility unaffected, contrary to his-
torical demographic transitions. In our model, even with these two assumptions, net fertility
responds to child mortality because child quality is heterogeneous and parents view healthy
and unhealthy children as imperfect substitutes. The epidemiological transition receives no at-
tention in the literature except for Morand (2002). Since Morand’s model does not account for
the shifting disease pattern observed during the transition nor its effect on fertility and child
quality, it is more appropriately viewed as a health transition that enhances overall quality of
life. We share Birchenall’s (2007) view that infectious disease declines were instrumental in the
transition towards modern economic growth. Birchenall distinguishes between infection and
case fatality rates and allows for childhood health to influence adultmortality, but the transition
itself occurs through parental investment in nutrition.
Closely related is de la Croix and Licandro’s (2013) explanation for western Europe’s fertility
transition based on rising life expectancy and sustained physical development. Their theory
does not explain though why a comparable physical development has not occurred in Africa.
By providing a micro-foundation for the relationship between mortality and health and by iso-
lating the scarring effect of childhood disease, we are able to account for Africa’s slow fertility
transition and its higher incidence of adult mortality andmorbidity. Our prior work, Aksan and
Chakraborty (2013), is the first to connect sub-Saharan Africa’s morbidity change to its slow fer-
tility transition. Using a partial equilibrium model and data on infectious disease, it identifies
the effect of child survival uncertainty. While we ignore uncertainty here, modeling the gen-
eral equilibrium effects of the mortality transition captures a broader canvas and time-series
behavior of mortality and fertility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a set of stylized facts on
the demographic and epidemiological transitions and health. Section 3 constructs a dynastic
model whose implications are developed in Sections 4 and 5. Quantitative experiments in Sec-
3In the industrialized world, a significant portion of the prevention-based life expectancy improvement and
fertility reduction had already occurred by the twentieth century, the period of study in Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007) and Hansen (2014). Any positive effect from health improvements would, hence, be understated.
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tion 6 highlight the cost of childhoodmorbidity and the model’s ability to explain SSA.
2 Some Facts
We begin with some facts on the demographic and epidemiological transitions. England &
Wales is taken to represent the historical transition since we have reliable time series data on
mortality, fertility and cause of death going back to the mid-nineteenth century.
2.1 The Demographic Transition
The conventional view of the demographic transition posits that falling child mortality makes
possible subsequent fertility declines. This is the pattern exhibited by early industrializers such
as England, Germany and Sweden where fertility responded to mortality with a lag. Figure 1
illustrates the case of England & Wales: the sharp decline in child mortality that began around
1872 was followed by declines in the total and net fertility rates.4
There is some evidence based on crude death rates and life expectancy at birth that mortal-
ity started falling in England&Wales earlier, from the late eighteenth century. Since age-specific
mortality rates are available only from the early nineteenth century – the basis for Figure 1 – it
is unclear to what extent those earlier mortality changes were amplified ormasked by changing
age-structure and, particularly, urbanization (Woods, 2000). The view among demographers is
that “the English mortality decline at the national level went through three phases: there was a
definite, though rathermodest, decline inmortality between 1780 and 1830; this declinewas ar-
rested for a period during the mid-nineteenth century; but a second, decisive period of decline
began during the 1870s” (Hinde, 2003, p. 195, emphasis added).
We focus on the latter period for several reasons. First, of course, is data availability and
clear evidence of a steep and secular decline in child mortality. Secondly, this decisive decline
was preceded by radical public health reforms that contained, in some cases eradicated, several
infectious diseases. McKeown’s (1976) view that nutrition and overall improvement in living
standards, rather than public health, played a vital role in Britain’s mortality transition is now
widely questioned (Preston, 1996, Fogel, 1997, Cutler et al., 2006). While the earlier mortality
decline in England may have occurred due to better nutrition, the emerging consensus is that
the late nineteenth century decline came decisively from public health initiatives. Thirdly, as
we show below, health of the English population improved in the late nineteenth century along
4Infant mortality did not start falling until the early 1900s. A succession of hot summers in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries reduced the availability of clean water, causing diarrhea outbreaks. It has been con-
jectured that infant mortality would have otherwise fallen earlier (Hinde, 2003). For comparability, we restrict the
analysis to child mortality rates in both the UK and SSA.
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with child mortality. Our theory connects disease prevention to health improvements and, in
our view, those improvementsmade England’s late nineteenth century fertility decline possible.
Hence the English transition is an appropriate benchmark against which we can compare the
effects of therapeutic interventions. Note also that while this link between child mortality and
fertility does not fit all historical transitions (Galor, 2005, Guinnane, 2011), it does fit twentieth
century declines: falling childmortality has been instrumental in worldwide fertility reductions
during 1955°2005 (Angeles, 2010).
Childmortality in sub-SaharanAfrica (SSA) has fallen dramatically over the past half-century.
Fertility, in contrast, has not fallen as rapidly as we have come to expect from successful transi-
tions (Figure 2). For example, while the child mortality rate (CMR) in Niger fell from 319.4 per
1,000 live births (1966) to 168.5 (2005), its total fertility rate (TFR) increased from 7.26 to 7.3.
Uganda’s CMR fell from 202.6 per 1,000 live births (1965) to 115.5 (2005), while its TFR declined
slightly from 7.1 to 6.6. The elasticity of TFR response with respect to CMR since the 1960s is
lowest for SSA, 0.48 versus 0.71°0.81 for other developing regions (World Bank). This response
is also weaker compared to England &Wales. While CMR fell by similar magnitudes during the
first forty years of transition, 46% in SSA (1965-2005) and 45% in England & Wales (1870-1910),
SSA’s TFR declined by 21% compared to 37% in the latter.
Of course what matters for the demographic transition is net fertility. Here the available
evidence is somewhatmixed. Angeles (2010) finds, using data on TFR andNFR, that net fertility
fell due to falling child mortality and income growth had little explanatory power. Using data
on the crude birth rate, Herzer et al. (2012) find the reverse, that mortality declines alone were
insufficient to reduce net fertility, economic growthwas necessary. In ourmodel income has no
effect on fertility. But it is not hard to imagine howweak GDP growth that depresses investment
in water and sanitation can keep child morbidity high – see section 2.3 below – even as CMR
falls. This would keep net fertility high even as total fertility fell. In this sense, Africa’s slow GDP
growth would reinforce the mortality-morbidity margin that we identify.5
2.2 The Epidemiological Transition
The onset of the epidemiological transition – the shift in mortality and disease patterns identi-
fied byOmran (1971) –makes possible the demographic transition. Declining infectious disease
mortality among children and the elderly is followed by declining non-infectious disease death,
primarily from CVDs, among the middle-aged and elderly. Figure 3 shows how the transition
unfolded in England &Wales: infectious disease mortality started falling around 1872 and non-
5On the other hand, since we are contrasting the African experience to that of England &Wales, it is also unclear
that income growth was instrumental in driving down the English net fertility rate (Bhattacharya and Chakraborty,
2014).
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infectious disease mortality followed after about twenty years (Arora, 2005).6
Here too the experience of SSA differs. Figure 4 compares infectious disease deaths for
children and non-infectious disease deaths for the elderly between SSA and England & Wales.
Statistics for the latter are reported at three levels of life expectancy at birth. English life ex-
pectancy of 53 during 1905-14 comes closest to the current life expectancy of 42°63 in SSA. Us-
ing that number as a crude age-standardizedmeasure, the infectious disease burden in the two
regions looks comparable. The non-infectious disease burden, on the other hand, is more than
four times higher in SSA. Underlying this is the earlier age at which CVD deaths have been oc-
curring there. The Global Burden of Disease project (2004) reports that CVD deaths accounted
for 30% of all non-HIV-related deaths among 30°69 year olds in SSA, about four times that in
the US (Leeder et al., 2003).
This difference is picked up by data on adult mortality. During the past seventy years, life
expectancy at birth has converged around the world due to improvements in child survival in
developing countries (Soares, 2007). In contrast, the adult survival rate, or its complement, the
probability of dying between the ages of 15 and 60 (45q15), shows no such tendency. In Figure 5
this non-convergence is driven by Africa’s persistently high adult mortality pre-dating the HIV
crisis.
2.3 ChildhoodMorbidity
One way to assess childhood morbidity is to look at adult stature, the cumulative product of
childhood nutrition net of various claims on it including infections. The decline of infectious
disease mortality in England & Wales was followed about fifteen years later by height gains in
successive cohorts of 18-year old males (Figure 6). These gains occurred as childhood disease
morbidity fell along with mortality (Bozzoli et al., 2009; see also Voth and Leunig, 1996).7
Compared to this clear pattern, DHS survey data presented in Figure 7 shows that cohorts of
Africanwomen enjoying better childhood survival did not experience pronounced height gains.
In fact, after modest gains, average height has fallen in SSA since 1960. In principle this reflects
the combined effect of childhood nutrition and disease exposure. Since nutrition in the first
five years of life are crucial for physical development, we report 5-year moving averages of daily
6Death rates are age-standardized. The epidemiological transition is often stated as an increasing incidence
of noninfectious disease deaths when infectious disease mortality falls. This is certainly true of England & Wales:
the share of all disease-caused deaths due to noninfectious disease rose over time. Arora’s work shows that this
is because people were living longer and that noninfectious disease mortality rates among the middle-aged and
elderly fell.
7The sharp fall in the decades preceding 1850 in Figure 6 has been linked to urbanization and a series of epi-
demics. It preceded the secular decline of child mortality. In fact it was the catalyst for aggressive public health
initiatives that made possible the subsequent mortality transition (Szreter, 1988). Nineteenth century height gains
were not unique to England (de la Croix and Licandro, 2013).
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calorie intake (FAO) in Figure 7. Except for the late eighties, nutrition has improved since 1960.8
Calorie supply data may not identify disruptions in food supply, for example due to civil
wars. Moradi (2006) finds that the latter explains little of the decline in stature. Likewise Africa’s
debt crisis and structural adjustment programs can only explain the decline in the late 1980s.
Even there the evidence is unclear. Real public health expenditures generally rose or remained
steady during structural adjustment due to increasedWorld Bank adjustment lending. User fees
instituted in some countries as part of the reforms were irregularly enforced, often accounting
for a small percentage of national budgets. Where reforms may have had some impact was in
shifting health care priorities from preventive to curative strategies (Sahn and Bernier, 1995),
consistent with our theory.
Two further clarifications are in order. First, the trends that emerge from Figure 7 are un-
likely to be driven by country composition. The nutrition data covers the same 44 countries
throughout these years. We do have missing observations for CMR during 1960-75 (23 coun-
tries with data in 1960, 29 in 1965, 38 in 1970, 42 in 1975, 44 1980 onwards). The height data
is available for over 30 countries, including 8 of the 10 most populous countries in SSA. Exact
country composition for a particular year changes, but for those countries for which height data
is reported in the DHS, the data is available for several decades. Akachi and Canning’s (2010)
systematic analysis, including restricting the sample to countries with complete data, affirms
the overall trend of Figure 7. Secondly, selection is unlikely to explain Figure 7. If innately strong
children survive to adulthoodwhenCMR is very high, recent declines in stature throughout SSA
may reflect a weakening of this selection effect. Yet this would have been also true of historical
transitions. As seen by a clear increase in adult stature following mortality declines, morbidity
must have declined enough in Europe to dominate any such selection effect.
We conclude that Figure 7 strongly indicates Africa’s childhood disease exposure slowed
physical improvements initially, possibly reversing them later, despite continuing improve-
ments in childhood survival.
2.4 Child Quality
Next consider evidence on the long-term effects of childhood health. Awell-established body of
research links adult height to higher earning, and birthweight to higher schooling attainment,
height and earnings. A recent example is Case and Paxson (2010) who find that taller individuals
attain higher levels of education and that height is positively associated with better economic,
health, and cognitive outcomes, associations only partly explained by the higher education lev-
8Figure 7 data are 1985 population weighted. Dropping Nigeria, which accounts for close to a quarter of SSA’s
population, takes the correlation between height and nutrition from 0.02 to a still weak 0.2. Protein intake shows
similar improvements over the years.
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els of taller individuals. Almond’s (2006) study of the effect of the 1918 influenza epidemic on
cohorts born in and around that time finds adverse lifetime socioeconomic and physical effects.
The process by which infectious diseases affect child quality is well understood: frequent
infections prevent the absorption of nutrients necessary for optimal cellular growth, affecting
children’s physical and cognitive development (Martorell and Habicht, 1986). Anemia is the
most common type of malarial morbidity in Africa, estimated to be 75% in areas where preva-
lence exceeds 25%. It is associated with poor school performance and lower earnings among
working adults (Snow et al., 2003; see Bleakley, 2007, for evidence on hookworm-related ane-
mia and Bleakley and Lange, 2009, for its effect on fertility). Malarial infections are blamed for
a 14-24% birthweight shortfall among slaves (Coelho andMcGuire, 2000), a 1.1 inch height gap
among Union Army veterans (Hong, 2007) and lower education and worse cognitive functions
in the Taiwanese population (Chang et al., 2011).
Diarrheal infections are the next highest cause of child mortality in Africa. Many children
survive them but infections are frequent, averaging 9 median episodes during the first 4 years
(Boschi-Pinto et al., 2006). Checkley et al. (2008) report that the possibility of stunting at 24
months of age increases multiplicatively with each diarrheal episode. More direct evidence
comes from Guerrant et al. (2003): diarrhea in the first 2 years of life is strongly associated
with impaired cognitive function 4°7 years later among Brazilian children even when disease
symptoms did not manifest.
2.5 Late-Life Mortality
Childhood infections can increase susceptibility to non-infectious disease later in life. Measles,
typhoid and malaria during childhood are known to be associated with cardiovascular prob-
lems, and pneumonia before age five to diminished respiratory function at ages 59-70 (Khosla,
1981, Barker 1994). Males who were in utero during the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 had a 23%
higher rate of heart disease in their 60°80s regardless of whether or not their mothers had vis-
ible flu symptoms (Mazumder et al., 2010). People who experienced higher malaria exposure
risk in Taiwan had a higher incidence of CVDs and a higher mortality hazard in old age (Chang
et al., 2011).
In England, France, Sweden and Switzerland, improved longevity in the elderly, as indicated
by declines in CVD, occurred among the same birth cohorts that experienced mortality reduc-
tion at younger ages. These cohorts were taller than their predecessors (Crimmins and Finch,
2006). Declining childhood and young adult infectious disease rates among Union Army veter-
ans accounted for nearly 50% of the higher survival rates among 50–64 year old males (Costa,
2003). Jousilahti et al.’s (2000) study of Finnish men and women offers another set of evidence
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linking childhood health to late-life mortality: height is inversely associated with CVD and total
mortality, controlling for other known risk factors.
Figure 5 hints at this link between infectious and non-infectious diseases: non-infectious
diseasemortality followed infectious diseasemortality by about a generation during the English
epidemiological transition.
3 TheModel
Our theory accounts for the facts outlined above by distinguishing between twoways childmor-
tality can be lowered: lower disease prevalence (reduced exposure) or lower case fatality rate
from an infection (better therapy or treatment). We argue that better therapy played a vital role
in SSA’s child mortality declines while historical declines, including England & Wales’, came
from the conquest of infectious diseases.9
The model economy is comprised of an infinite sequence of three-period lived overlapping
generations of families. Not everyone lives for all three periods as some children die before
reaching adulthood and some older adults die prematurely. Individuals are socially and eco-
nomically active only in youth and old age. As active decisionmakers, young parents care about
their own consumption and the number and human capital of their surviving children. Besides
working, they allocate their time to raising surviving children and educating them.
Some children die in their early childhood from infectious disease. Define the survival rate
of infected children by p ¥ 1°d where d is the average case fatality rate from infections, that
is, the mortality rate conditional on contracting infections. If i denotes the average childhood
infection rate, then the (unconditional) child mortality rate is id . While the fatality rate is taken
to be exogenously given by the state ofmedical knowhow and health care, the infection rate will
be later determined endogenously.
All children are assumed to be equally healthy at birth. Of the nt children born to a young
adult in period t , (1° it )nt children are healthy (denoted by h), never having contracted infec-
tious diseases. Another pitnt children are unhealthy (denoted by u), having experienced but
survived from chronic infections. The total number of surviving children is then (1° it )nt +
pitnt = (1°dit )nt .
9Since developing countries have all benefited from cures invented in the West, this also explains why the TFR
response to CMR in other developing regions, while higher than SSA’s, has been generally weaker than England &
Wales’. That adult stature improved and adultmortality fell in these regions indicates thatmorbidity fell sufficiently
with mortality unlike SSA (details available upon request).
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3.1 Households and Preferences
A parent invests education time eht 2 [0,1] and eut 2 [0,1] towards each type of surviving child.
The time cost of rearing an unhealthy child, øu , could be different from that of a healthy child,
øh , although it need not be for the analysis. As an unhealthy child may needmore parental care
due to frequent illness, it is natural to think øu ∏ øh .
Parents base their decisions on the expected number of survivors of each type. A young
parent with human capital xt maximizes expected lifetime utility10
Ut = lnctt +Ø¡t lnctt+1+∞µ ln[(1°dit )nt ]+∞(1°µ)
∑
1° it
1°dit lnx
h
t+1+
pit
1°dit lnx
u
t+1
∏
(1)
by choosing {ctt ,c
t
t+1, st ,nt ,e
h
t ,e
u
t } subject to the constraints
ctt =
h
1°
n
(1° it )(øh +eht )+pit (øu +eut )
o
nt ° st
i
zt (2)
ctt+1 =
Rt+1
¡t
st zt (3)
xht+1 = ∏("+qheht )∫x∑t x¯1°∑t , eht ∏ 0 (4)
xut+1 = ∏("+queut )∫x∑t x¯1°∑t , eut ∏ 0 (5)
and taking the vector (¡t , it ,wt ,Rt+1) as given. Here Ø 2 (0,1) is a subjective discount rate,
¡t 2 (0,1] is the probability of surviving through old age and µ 2 (0,1) is parental valuation of
child quantity versus quality. There are decreasing returns to quality investment ∫ 2 (0,1), the
productivity parameter ∏ is positive and "> 0 ensures positive human capital in the absence of
quality investment. Wage per unit of human capital is represented by w while s 2 (0,1) denotes
the propensity to save out of “full income” z ¥wx. The second budget constraint incorporates
the assumption of perfect annuities.
The last term in the utility function is a joy-of-giving bequest motive; (1° i )/(1°di ) is the
fraction of surviving children who are healthy, pi/(1°di ) the fraction who are unhealthy. For
i = 0 this term simplifies to lnxh , for i = 1 to lnxu . Hence the utility function nests a commonly
used quantity-quality specification for homogeneous child quality, ∞ [µ lnn+ (1°µ) lnx]. Em-
bedded in parental altruism is an important assumption: healthy and unhealthy children are
imperfect substitutes. As will be clear shortly, this is central to generating the appropriate fer-
tility and investment responses from a decrease in child mortality.
The last two constraints in the parent’s decision problem specify the human capital produc-
tion function for each type of surviving child. Besides parental investment and human capital,
10Utility from premature death in old age is being normalized to a large negative number and parameter values
are implicitly assumed to ensure old age consumption remains sufficiently above zero. That adults do not die from
CVDs during their working life is a simplification.
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they depend on the average human capital across working adults, x¯, when ∑ 2 (0,1). The re-
turn to investment in child quality depends on health human capital q j , j 2 {h,u}, which is the
outcome of a child’s disease experience. Specifically it takes the value qh = 1 should the child
have experienced no (significant or recurrent) infectious disease and qu = ± 2 (0,1) otherwise.
That illness from infectious disease depreciates intrinsic health and cognitive abilities through
± is relevant only when quality investment is positive. In other words, in the absence of edu-
cational investment, childhood morbidity has no effect on the quantity-quality tradeoff. Since
the evidence on child quality suggests that the return on nutritional investment too depends on
the childhood disease experience, in amore general setup child quality will include all forms of
investment that augment a child’s future labor productivity.
3.2 Old AgeMortality
Old age non-infectious diseases affect survival when people are retired and consume out of
accumulated wealth. The survival probability depends on childhood health in line with the
evidence presented in section 2.5. Specifically, an individual who survived from childhood in-
fections in period t °1 to become a young adult in period t faces a lower survival probability,
¡u , as an elderly in period t +1 compared to ¡h for an individual who was a healthy child. That
is,
¡t =
(
¡u , ifIt°1 = 1
¡h , ifIt°1 = 0
(6)
where It°1 is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the person was infected as a child
in t °1 and zero otherwise, and ¡u <¡h = 1.
3.3 Aggregate Production and Factor Prices
Let X denote the aggregate stock of human capital andK the aggregate stock of physical capital.
Production of final output Y occurs according to the technology
Yt = AK Æt X 1°Æt (7)
where A > 0 and Æ 2 (0,1).
The depreciation rate on physical capital is hundred percent. Let R denote the rental on
capital as well as the interest factor and kt ¥ Kt/Xt the physical-to-human capital ratio. In
perfectly competitive output and inputs markets, (7) leads to the familiar pricing functions,
wt = (1°Æ)AkÆt and Rt =ÆAkÆ°1t for labor and capital respectively.
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3.4 Household Decisions
Turn now to household behavior and denote the average cost per childbirth by
¬t ¥ (1° it )(øh +eht )+pit (øu +eut ). (8)
Substituting the production function for human capital into (1) and ignoring additive constant
terms, the decision problem becomes
Max{st ,nt ,eht ,eut } ln
£°
1°¬tnt ° st
¢
zt
§+Ø¡t ln[st zt ]+∞µ ln[(1°dit )nt ]
+∫∞(1°µ)
∑
1° it
1°dit ln("+e
h
t )+
pit
1°dit ln("+±e
u
t )
∏
subject to eht , e
u
t ∏ 0. Inada conditions guarantee that inequality constraints for consumption
in the two periods are satisfied. Besides the interior equilibrium, two types of corner equilibria
are possible: eut = eht = 0 and eut = 0, eht > 0. As long as the average cost per childbirth is low,
which occurs for relatively high prevalence rates, parents choose large families over investing
in child quality.11
Interior equilibrium
In an interior equilibrium for quality investment, investment in unhealthy children is lower the
higher is the morbidity effect of infections (lower ±)
eut = eht °
µ
1°±
±
∂
". (9)
In turn this implies their human capital is less than that of healthy children, xut+1 = ±∫xht+1. Using
(9), we express the average cost of fertility as
¬t = øt + (1°dit )eht °¥it (10)
where øt ¥ (1° it )øh + pitøu is the average cost of child quantity and ¥ ¥ (1°±)"p/± the cost
saving from investing in unhealthy children relative to healthier ones. It follows that
st = Ø¡t1+∞µ+Ø¡t , nt =
∞µ
1+∞µ+Ø¡t
µ
1
¬t
∂
,
11Here parents do not take any action to lower their children’s exposure to infections. Since infectious disease
transmission depends strongly on a negative externality, for high enough prevalence rates, parents would opti-
mally choose not to invest in prevention (Chakraborty et al., 2010). We focus on macro-level prevention when
discussing the health transition. Prevention at the household level would reinforce the benefits of these macro-
policies. Without the latter, prevention at the household level would be too weak to facilitate the transition.
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and that quality investment in healthy children is
eht =
∫(1°µ)
µ°∫(1°µ)
∑
øt °¥it
1°dit °
"µ
∫(1°µ)
∏
. (11)
Note that quality investments are decreasing in it when√(it )¥ (øt °¥it )/(1°dit ) is decreasing
in it . This requires that p(øu °øh)°¥< 0, or,
øu < øh +
µ
1°±
±
∂
" (A1)
which is satisfied for sure when øu = øh . Assumption (A1) requires that unhealthy children are
not too costly; else, fewer sickly children would free up so much parental time that parents
would choose to have more children. For (11) to be economically meaningful and to satisfy the
second order conditions we assume that
"< ∫(1°µ)øh/µ and ∫< µ/(1°µ) (A2)
respectively. The first restriction ensures that maximal human capital investment in healthy
children is positive, that is eht > 0 when it = 0. It implies that intrinsic human capital " is not so
high that parental investment is redundant. The second restriction µ > ∫(1°µ) is related to the
standard assumption in the literature that parents caremore about the quantity of children than
quality for the second order condition to be satisfied. The condition is actually less stringent:
all we need is parents do not value quality “toomuch” since the restriction is satisfied even with
µ < 1/2 (that is, quality is valued more than quantity) as long as ∫< µ/(1°µ).
Collecting these results, equilibrium expressions for the average cost of childbearing and
human capital are
¬t = µ
µ°∫(1°µ)
£
øt °¥it ° (1°dit )"
§
,
xht+1 = ∏x∑t x¯1°∑t
∑
∫(1°µ)
µ°∫(1°µ)
∏∫∑øt °¥it
1°dit °"
∏∫
,
xut+1 = ±∫xht+1.
Unhealthy children receive less human capital investment and the return on that investment is
lower. As adults they also face lower longevity that reduces their saving propensity. Differential
human capital outcomes for healthy and unhealthy children arise in our model because we as-
sume the two types are imperfect substitutes and parents do not take an egalitarian approach
towards their offspring’s human capital. If they did, they would have chosen eut = eht /± > eht ,
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that is, more investment in unhealthy children to compensate for their health shock.12 In not
following this approach, we are relying on an established literature in development economics
that consistently finds evidence of intrahousehold discrimination. For example, Akresh et al.’s
(2012) study on Burkina Faso finds that lower ability children are typically less likely to be en-
rolled in school and that having higher ability siblings has at least as much effect on parental
quality investment. While it is reasonable to think that some families would eschew such dis-
crimination, the overall evidence indicates that such behavior is much too common in devel-
oping countries.
Corner equilibrium
Besides assumption (A2), positive quality investment in healthy children requires that
°h(it )¥√(it )° µ"
∫(1°µ) ∏ 0.
Likewise eut ∏ 0 requires that
°u(it )¥√(it )° µ"
∫(1°µ) °
µ°∫(1°µ)
∫(1°µ)
µ
1°±
±
∂
"∏ 0.
Evidently °h ∏ °u while (A1) ensures that √ is decreasing in it . Let the threshold prevalence
rates i h and i u < i h be defined implicitly by °h(i h)= 0 and °u(i u)= 0.
For it 2 (i u , i h), °h > 0 but °u < 0. Here parents invest in healthy children but not in un-
healthy ones: eht > 0, eut = 0. While the saving propensity st is the same as in the interior equi-
librium, other decisions change. Using the new expression for the average cost per childbirth,
¬t = øt + (1° it )eht , we obtain
eht =
∫(1°µ)
µ°∫(1°µ)
≥
1°it
1°dit
¥ ∑ øt
1°dit °
"µ
∫(1°µ)
∏
, nt = ∞µ1+∞µ+Ø¡t
µ
1
¬t
∂
.
For it > i h , on the other hand, °h < 0 and parents do not invest in either healthy or unhealthy
children, eut = eht = 0. The saving decision is unchanged but since the average cost is lower still
at ¬t = øt , fertility is the highest in this corner equilibrium
nt = ∞µ1+∞µ+Ø¡t
µ
1
¬t
∂
.
12Even so, healthy and unhealthy children would have different lifetime utility since their ¡’s differ.
15
The Effect of Mortality
Relevant to the demographic transition are how quantity and quality of children respond to
child mortality. The latter depends on the prevalence rate it and the case fatality rate d , both of
which are exogenous to a parent’s decisions.
The household fertility rate nt , which we shall call the total fertility rate (TFR) for conve-
nience even though it differs across households due to adult longevity, responds negatively to
fertility cost ¬t . Consider first interior quality equilibria where ¬t is a decreasing function of
both it and d by assumption (A1). Here a decrease in child mortality either through the preva-
lence or case fatality rate lowers the TFR, consistent with the facts outlined earlier.
For the demographic transition, what is also relevant is the expected number of surviving
children, nˆt = (1°dit )nt , or the net fertility rate (NFR). This is given by
nˆt = ∞[µ°∫(1°µ)]1+∞µ+Ø¡t
∑
1
√t °"
∏
where√t was defined earlier. Under assumption (A1),√t is decreasing in it but increasing in d .
Thismeans the NFR responds positively to it but negatively to d . When childmortality falls due
to lower prevalence rates, the TFR decline is strong enough to ensure that NFR falls. In contrast,
a decrease in the child mortality rate due to lower case fatality elicits a weak TFR response and
the NFR increases despite fertility falling.13
Next consider the quantity-quality tradeoff. Quality investment in either type of child is
increasing in √t . Thus a reduction in child mortality through lower prevalence raises quality
investments in both healthy and unhealthy children. The opposite is true for gains in child
survival through lower d . A lower d implies that fewer sickly children succumb and a higher
proportion of surviving children are of low quality. Parents have to devote more time towards
raising unhealthy children on whom quality investment yields low returns.
Child mortality has a different effect on population growth in corner equilibria. For exam-
ple, when parents do not invest in either type of child, the NFR responds negatively to it but
positively to d unless øu = øh in which case the NFR is unaffected, similar to Doepke (2005).
Lower d shifts the childbearing cost towards unhealthy children who require more attention,
lowering the demand for children. In contrast, lower i shifts the cost towards healthier children
and demand rises. In the next generation, however, less healthy (healthier) adults will have
more (fewer) children in response to their lower (greater) longevity, ¡t . Hence the overall NFR
13A lower prevalence or case fatality ratemeans fewer sickly children and, ceteris paribus, less time raising a given
number of children. Assumption A1 is a robustness check to show that as long as unhealthy children do not require
too much parental time commitment, total and net fertility rates behave this way when child mortality falls. Later,
in the quantitative simulations, we restrict to øh = øh for which these comparative statics results hold for sure.
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response is ambiguous. Since we set øu = øh in the quantitative work later, only the longevity
margin is at play for SSA’s simulated net fertility transition during the 1960s.
Beyond these, a continued decline in prevalence as it crosses first the threshold i h , then
i u , has a general equilibrium effect: parents switch from valuing quantity alone to also valuing
child quality. Furthermore, as a reduction in prevalence extends adult longevity, parents place
a higher weight on their future consumption and fertility falls further. While the overall effect
on fertility depends on equilibrium type and child morbidity, a reduction in case fatality alone
does not generate a similar effect from adult survival to family size.
3.5 Disease Dynamics
While the prevalence rate it is exogenous to a household’s decisions, it evolves endogenously
in the aggregate. A pre-transition or transitional economy with high average mortality is best
viewed as one where infectious diseases are endemic. We use a parsimonious version of the
SIR epidemiological model for this. Infections can spread from infected to susceptible individ-
uals directly or indirectly through non-human disease vectors. Tuberculosis, an airborne dis-
ease, largely spreads from close proximity to infected human. Formalaria, the infection spreads
throughmosquitoes that take bloodmeal from an infective person and, after sporogony, release
the parasite into the bloodstream of a susceptible individual. Diarrhea, on the other hand, can
spread both directly and indirectly as the vector can be any number of possibilities including
food, water, livestock and humans.
To account for these modes of transmission, the microbial load is assumed to be propor-
tional to the fraction of currently working-age populationwhowere infected in their childhood.
This implicitly assumes that the ratio of vectors to the affected population is constant: if more
children were infected, human and non-human vectors increase proportionately for future in-
fections. For instance, mosquitoes become carriers when picking up the parasite from a human
andmore of them do whenmore people are infected. The current prevalence rate it then prox-
ies for the density of disease microbes in t +1.
Susceptible newborns are exposed to µ > 1 types of disease vectors and the transmission
rate from a random match with a disease vector is a > 0. Then the number of newborns who
contract infections in t+1 is It+1 =ºt n¯t+1Lt+1 where ºt =µa
£
pit/(1°dit )
§
and the Lt+1 young
adults at t +1 each have n¯t+1 children on average. For high enough prevalence, ºt can exceed
one. Hence we specify that the prevalence rate it ¥ It/(n¯tLt ) follows
it+1 = g (it )¥min{º(it ),1} (12)
given i0 > 0. Equation (12) always entertains zero prevalence as a steady state whose stability
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depends on g 0(0) = µap. The product µa is the so-called epidemiological threshold or basic
reproduction ratio, the number of secondary cases per primary case of infection. We assume
that in a pre-transition population
µa > 1, (A4)
that is, each infection is capable of causing multiple others. Under some conditions this can
cause the disease to become endemic over time. In addition to (A4) when we have µap > 1, the
zero-prevalence steady state is asymptotically unstable and º(ıˆ) > 1 for ıˆ ¥ 1/[d +µap]. Full
prevalence is the only asymptotically stable steady state in this scenario, as in Figure 8(a), and
the disease is eventually endemic. Given the broad spectrum of infections that children are
exposed to in developing countries, i represents the probability of contracting any number of
diseases during childhood. Hence the full-prevalence steady state in Figure 8(a) is best thought
of as an environment where these diseases, not all of them or the same ones, affect all at some
point during their childhood.
Maintaining assumption (A4), suppose instead the survival rate is low enough that µap < 1.
This corresponds to Figure 8(b), where an intermediate steady state appears at i§ = (1°µap)/d
that is increasing (decreasing) in the case fatality (survival) rate d (p). For initial prevalence
i0 > i§, infections spread rapidly until full prevalence is reached. Infections eventually abate,
in contrast, for i0 below i§. Even though the basic reproduction ratio exceeds one, enough in-
fected peoplemust survive as vehicles of transmission in order for the disease to reach endemic
proportions. Since ıˆ and i§ are decreasing in p, better therapy by raising (lowering) p (d) makes
full prevalence more likely for a given i0. Higher p ensures a larger pool of infective agents and
faster transmission rates. In contrast, since i§ is decreasing in µa, improvements in prevention
make full prevalence less likely.14
The last case, Figure 8(c), holds when (A4) is overturned which also implies µap < 1. Zero
prevalence is the unique asymptotically stable steady state: the basic reproduction ratio is too
weak to forever sustain infections. This approximates the relatively low prevalence of infec-
tious diseases observed in high-income countries. Malarial, helminth and many other types of
infections common in developing countries are negligible in high-income countries. The dis-
ease burden of infectious and parasitic diseases, measured in DALYs, was 1% of the population
under the age of five in high-income countries in 2011 compared to 67% in low-income coun-
tries (Global Burden of Disease, 2013). The burden of diarrheal infections specifically was 0.5%
14This distinction between the effects of p and µa is somewhat artificial. For pneumonia and pertussis, for
example, antibiotics can reduce the time a person remains contagious. Prevention, however, reduces prevalence
more than treatment by also removing the window of contagion. Our calibration allows for the possibility that a
given intervention has both preventive and curative effects.
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in high-income countries and 20% in low-income countries. The figure for childhood-cluster
diseases (whooping cough, diptheria, measles and tetanus) was similarly 0.01% versus 9%, re-
spectively.
4 Intertemporal Equilibrium
4.1 Population and Labor Supply
From here on we make the simplifying assumption that ∑= 0 so that a child’s human capital is
determined by his health history and economic aggregates, not parental characteristics. This
human capital takes one of two values that depends on the average stock of human capital and
the prevalence rate.
Young adults in t are distinguished by their human capital xt and old-age survival rate ¡t .
While human capital can take values on a continuum, old-age survival can be either ¡u or ¡h =
1. The cumulative distribution function Gt (x,¡) denotes the fraction of young adults at t with
human capital at or below x and adult survival at or below ¡. Let gt (x|¡) be the conditional
density function of xt for a given value of ¡t . A young adult with human capital xt and old-age
survival ¡t has nt = n(it ,¡t ) children of whom pitn(it ,¡t ) grow up to be unhealthy adults with
xut+1 units of human capital and old-age survival rate ¡t+1 =¡u . The remaining (1° it )n(it ,¡t )
surviving children grow up healthy with xht+1 units of human capital and old-age survival¡t+1 =
¡h . This determines the future working population as
Lt+1 = (1°dit )
"X
¡
ΩZ
n(it ,¡)gt (x|¡)dx
æ
Pr(¡t =¡)
#
Lt (13)
given it . The probability that ¡t takes the value ¡u is Pr(¡t = ¡u) = pit°1/(1° dit°1). The
aggregate human capital of Lt workers is Xt = LtP¡ £Rxgt (x|¡)dx§Pr(¡) and human capital
per worker x¯t ¥ Xt/Lt . Using the latter, output per worker can be expressed as yt = AkÆt x¯t .
Suppose worker type is costlessly observed and annuity sellers calibrate their returns to the
mortality risk of each group. Healthy workers earn the (gross) return R/¡h on their saving,
unhealthy workers earn the higher return R/¡u and aggregate saving is given by
St =
∑
æu
ΩZ
xgt (x|¡u)dx
æ
Pr(¡t =¡u)+æh
ΩZ
xgt (x|¡h)dx
æ
Pr(¡t =¡h)
∏
wtLt
where the saving propensities are
æu ¥ Ø¡u1+Ø¡u +∞µ <
Ø¡h
1+Ø¡h +∞µ ¥æh .
19
Asset market clearing is ensured by the usual condition Kt+1 = St .
4.2 Dynamics
The aggregate stock of human capital comprises of the human capital of healthy and unhealthy
workers
Xt+1 =
∑
pit
1°dit x
u
t+1+
1° it
1°dit x
h
t+1
∏
Lt+1.
The human capital of each type, xht+1 and x
u
t+1, is linear in x¯t where the proportionality func-
tions Ωht and Ωut depend on the prevalence rate according to
Ωht =
8>>><>>>:
∏
h
∫(1°µ)
µ°∫(1°µ)
n
øt°¥it
1°dit °"
oi∫
when 0∑ it < i u ,
∏
h
∫(1°µ)
µ°∫(1°µ)(1°it )/(1°dit )
n
øt
1°dit °"
1°it
1°dit
oi∫
when i u ∑ it < i h ,
∏"∫ when i h ∑ it ∑ 1,
and Ωut = ±∫Ωht in the first case, ∏"∫ in the latter two. The evolution of human capital per
worker can now be parsimoniously represented by
x¯t+1 ¥ Xt+1Lt+1 =
∑
pit
1°dit Ωut +
1° it
1°dit Ωht
∏
x¯t ¥ Ω(it )x¯t (14)
and asset market clearing by
Kt+1 =
∑
æuΩut
pit°1
1°dit°1 +æhΩht
1° it°1
1°dit°1
∏
(1°Æ)AkÆt x¯t°1Lt (15)
given K0 > 0 units of capital owned by the initial old generation and the distribution G0 of the
initial young adult population. Note that the disease history i°1 > 0 need not be separately
specified as it is part ofG0. The evolution of the cumulative distribution is determined by
Gt+1(x 0,¡0)= LtLt+1
"X
¡
ΩZ
(1°dit )n(¡, it )I (xt+1 ∑ x 0)gt (x|¡)dx
æ
Pr(¡t =¡)
#
Pr(¡t+1 ∑¡0)
(16)
whereI is an indicator function.
Definition. The general equilibrium of this economy consists of sequences of aggregate variables
{Kt ,Lt ,Xt , it } and cumulative distribution functions Gt (x,¡) that satisfy equations (12) – (16),
given K0 > 0, i0 > 0 andG0.
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5 Transitions
Since disease prevalence does not depend on economic behavior, equation (12) evolves inde-
pendently of equations (14) and (15). The long run trajectory of this economy is driven by dis-
ease dynamics, specifically the vector of parameters (i°1, i0,µ,a,p).
First note that steady-state growth of output per worker depends on whether or not human
capital accumulation can be sustained on its own. That requires Ω(it )> 1 in (14) in which case
a decrease in the prevalence rate unambiguously raises the rate of human, and thus, physical
capital accumulation. When limt!1 it = 0, the asymptotic growth factor of human capital and
output per worker is
Ω(0)=∏
∑
∫(1°µ)(øh °")
µ°∫(1°µ)
∏∫
.
When limt!1 it = 1, since no child receives quality investment, the long-run growth factor is
Ω(1)= p∏"∫ < Ω(0).
The saving propensities æh and æu have no effect on the growth rate, only level effect on the
balanced growth path (BGP). Thus two BGPs are possible and the economy converges to only
one of them for a given vector (i°1, i0,µ,a,p). The transition from one (Malthusian regime) to
the other (modern growth regime) can only be exogenous, for example due to an exogenous
reduction in child mortality.
5.1 Balanced Growth Paths
The first BGP, that we call aMalthusian regime, exists when (A4) holds and infectious disease
fatalities are high enough that µap < 1 (Figure 8b). For i0 > i§, full prevalence is the only sta-
tionary equilibrium. Along this BGP, fertility remains high and infections extract a high mortal-
ity toll on children. As all children are affected, survivors carry their morbidity burden in the
form of low human capital and high risk of premature death from non-communicable disease.
Labor income is low, and low adult longevity implies low rates of investment in physical capital.
This BGP exhibits slow (if any) growth in income per capita of Ω(1)°1 and persistent morbidity.
The second stationary equilibrium exhibits modern economic growth (MEG) and corre-
sponds to µa < 1 (Figure 8c). Absent any threat of infections, child survival is ensured, fertility
low and human capital relatively high. This economy is also in a post-epidemiological transi-
tion phase where adult longevity is maximal. High rates of investment in physical and human
capital ensure a high growth rate of Ω(0)°1.
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Since the prevalence rate is either zero or hundred percent, we can easily compare child
quantity and quality outcomes in the two steady states. We proceed with the assumption, vali-
dated later by our calibration, that i u < 1 and i h > 0 so that eu(i = 1)= 0 and eh(i = 0)> 0. Recall
that the average fertility cost ¬ is decreasing in the prevalence rate. In the Malthusian BGP, this
cost takes the lowest possible value ¬L = (1°d)øu , in the MEG BGP the highest possible value
¬H = µ (øh °")/[µ°∫(1°µ)]. It follows that the TFR in the Malthusian BGP takes the high value
nH and in the MEG BGP a lower value nL where
nH = ∞µ1+∞µ+¡u
∑
1
(1°d)øu
∏
, nL = ∞µ1+∞µ+¡h
µ
µ°∫(1°µ)
µ
∂∑
1
øh °"
∏
.
The fertility differential across these steady-state values is driven by several parameters. The pa-
rameters (d ,øu ,øh ,±) are related to the cost of fertility, parameters (¡u ,¡h) determine parental
willingness to substitute between personal consumption and altruistic behavior while (µ,∫,")
are related to the net benefit of quality investment. The corresponding net fertility rates in the
two steady states are
nˆH = (1°d)nH , nˆL = nL
and human capital investment per child
eu = 0, eh = ∫(1°µ)
µ°∫(1°µ)
µ
øh ° µ"
∫(1°µ)
∂
respectively, since all children are of homogeneous quality in either BGP.
5.2 Transitions Then
Start with assumption (A4) which is more likely when µa is relatively high. Prior to the pub-
lic health and medical innovations of mid-to-late nineteenth century England, fatalities from
childhood infections d would have been high too. Such a pre-transition economy corresponds
to Figure 8(b) with i0 > i§.
John Snow’s work in identifying the cause of London’s 1854 cholera epidemic, the Public
Health Acts of 1848 and 1875 and the commissioning of London’s integrated sewerage system
in 1865 paved the way for the eradication of infectious disease in England (Szreter, 1988). Im-
proved sanitation and water management led to cleaner water supplies, food safety and ef-
fective sewage disposal. Supervision of water, food and pasteurization of milk drastically cut
down the incidence of cholera, dysentry, typhoid, hookworm, diarrhea, measles and whoop-
ing cough. Immunization programs for diptheria, smallpox, tuberculosis and whooping cough
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complemented these public health reforms 1880 onwards. Between 1861 and 1900, over 55% of
England’s mortality decline was accounted for by the control of five diseases – smallpox, scarlet
fever, whooping cough, diarrhea and typhoid – all of which affected children in large numbers
(Hinde, 2003). Therapy played a minor role; antibiotics for scarlet fever, for instance, were to
be invented later. A similar prevention-based intervention also explainsmortality reductions in
nineteenth century US (Cutler et al., 2006).
These preventive breakthroughs are akin to a reduction in µa. When the reduction is large
enough to overturn (A4), zero becomes the unique asymptotically stable steady state as in Fig-
ure 8(c). But innovations do not have to be so drastic as to eliminate i§. Modest continuing
improvements inµa keep raising this threshold prevalence rate, that is i§ keeps falling in Figure
8(b), until an economy converging towards full prevalence falls below it. From then on, since
the transmission rate has been brought sufficiently under control, infectious disease pathogens
naturally die out. Falling infectious disease mortality and morbidity usher in a fertility transi-
tion. Both TFR and NFR decline, as parents substitute towards quality investment and late-life
survival improves. Rapid demographic and disease transitions, in turn, drive the economy to-
wards MEG.
5.3 Transitions Now
Twentieth century reductions in childmortality in developing countries have been facilitated by
the transfer of public health innovations and medical technology, notably vaccines and antibi-
otics, from the West. In some cases, such as smallpox and polio, these transfers have wiped out
major killers of children. Yet progress towards eradication has been uneven and nowhere is this
more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Despite a half-century of falling child mortal-
ity at a rate comparable to England & Wales, prevalence rates for Africa’s major killer diseases
remain high.
This is due to two reasons: deficiencies of best practice interventions and moribund public
health systems. Take malaria and diarrhea which together accounted for 34% of child deaths
in Africa in 2005 (WHO). The lack of an effective vaccine and inability of current technolo-
gies to drastically control disease transmission have made malaria eradication much harder
in Africa than in other parts of the world. After some initial success, malaria control strategies
have floundered. Eradication campaigns during the 1960-70s reduced malarial mortality by
18%, much of it due to better therapy (chloroquine), some due to vector control (DDT). Since
the 1980s the disease has resurged to pre-1960 levels from chloroquine resistance and vecto-
rial resistance to DDT. It now accounts for 18% of child deaths in SSA, as it did prior to 1960.15
15It is conceivable that this resurgence partly accounts for the drop in adult stature in the 1980s directly, and
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Diarrheal mortality, on the other hand, has fallen in Africa by about 10.5% during 1990-2000.
Most of this reduction is not due to lower incidence but from the spread of an effective treat-
ment (ORT) which reduced diarrheal mortality by 9% (Ewbank and Gribble, 1993; Boschi-Pinto
et al., 2006). Moreover ORT usage rates remain below 50%, as low as 7% in Botswana (UNICEF).
The problem is compounded by misplaced priorities: most interventions have been directed
towards containing acute dehydrating diarrhea through ORT while ignoring antibiotic therapy
for treating dysentery and persistent diarrhea. A review of 73 studies covering 23 countries dur-
ing 1970°90, at the height of child mortality declines, found that children experienced a high
average diarrheal episodes of 5 per year (ARCH Project Special Report, 1998). Since as much
as 88% of diarrheal deaths in Africa is water and sanitation related, this reflects an institutional
failure to provide adequate sanitation and potable water, interventions that so radically trans-
formed England’s disease landscape (Guerrant et al., 2003).
Africa’s fastest child mortality declines occurred during 1975-85 as the WHO launched new
vaccination programs. Under the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), vaccination for
measles, diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus, poliomyelitis, and tuberculosis improved significantly.
Prior to eradication in 1979, smallpox killed 30% of those infected and left 65-80% of survivors
with visible scars, in many cases blind. Eradication had a strong impact not just on child mor-
tality but on long-term morbidity too. Similarly, complicated by malnutrition and parasitic in-
fections, measles fatality rates used to be as high as 25% in Africa. In this case, however, the
reduction in measles cases from the introduction of the vaccine in 1964 would have made little
difference to overall childhoodmorbidity sincemeasles does not usually have long-term health
effects (Ewbank and Gribble, 1993).16
Ultimately successful disease prevention rests on both private (e.g. boiling water, getting
vaccinated, investing in insecticide-sprayed bed nets) and public interventions (e.g. provi-
sion of clean water, accessible and well-equipped health clinics, regular draining of stagnant
water).17 Private health investment exhibits positive externalities, so without public interven-
indirectly from co-morbidity with other diseases.
16Measles remains a leading cause of African child mortality, a lesson in the limitations of technology transfer.
Introduction of the vaccine in West Africa was subject to political and business pressure as the US government
advocated a US-produced vaccine over a French one despite sparse evidence of its effectiveness. Besides mis-
calculating the target population and under-providing vaccines, USAID failed to anticipate ground realities. The
vaccines required careful storage in cold temperatures, out of the sun. Even with refrigerators this proved to be
challenging in West Africa’s hot climate. Lawrence K. Altman provides an entertaining account in “How Tiny Er-
rors in Africa Led to a Global Triumph”, New York Times, Sept. 26, 2011, and explains how this paradoxically led
to a successful smallpox campaign. Subsequent vaccination programs have not always proved to be as effective
as clinical trials due to the low level of health services, inappropriate age at vaccination and incorrect vaccination
procedures (Ewbank and Gribble, 1993).
17Prevention seems to have been vital in eliminatingmalaria, cholera and smallpox during Sri Lanka, Costa Rica,
Jamaica and Kerala’s (India) successful demographic transitions. This was made possible by improvements in
public health and schooling as well as the relatively higher status enjoyed by women in the two South Asian cases
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tion there is too little of it. Effective public intervention, on the other hand, requires credible
macroeconomic policies and institutions that are costlier to implement than importing (sub-
sidized) therapeutic interventions. Low levels of public health funding in sub-Saharan Africa
have shifted focus to a handful of cost effective treatments. In some cases a curative strategy
has been prioritized over prevention (Ewbank and Gribble, 1993; Sahn and Bernier, 1995).
In terms of our theory, these examples demonstrate that child mortality has fallen in sub-
Saharan Africa through a combination of better cures (lower d) andweaker transmission (lower
µa), the first of which would have had a weak effect on fertility choice and human capital in-
vestment. Starting with i > i§ in Figure 8(b), a decrease in µa will raise i§ while a decrease in d
will lower it. The former makes it easier to escape full prevalence, the latter makes it harder. It
requires a much stronger decline in µa for the economy to get all the way to Figure 8(c) which
happens when it has declined by enough to overturn (A4) and eliminate i§. There is also a com-
position effect from lower d : a higher proportion of surviving children are of low health, de-
pressing returns on their human capital investment. Mortality falls but morbidity may rise on
the whole: the resulting slower demographic and disease transitions lead to slower economic
growth. We proceed to examine the quantitative significance of such a mortality transition.
6 Quantitative Experiments
We calibrate the model and present three experiments. The first experiment simulates Eng-
land’s transitions and compares them to slower counterfactuals relevant for developing coun-
tries generally where only the trigger for the mortality transition differs. The second is specif-
ically tailored to account for transitions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and compares them to a
faster alternative had morbidity fallen rapidly. Finally we make a general point, that child mor-
tality improvements which have contributed globally to life expectancy improvements have lit-
tle effect on economic growth unless accompanied by improving morbidity.
6.1 Parameter Values
Table 1 reports benchmark parameter values. Childhood is assumed to last 15 years and each
period of adulthood potentially 30 years long. Maximum longevity is then 75 years, commen-
surate with life expectancy in post-transition UK in the 1950s and 1960s.
A pre-transition economy in our model is at full prevalence. Assuming pre-transition UK
(1860°69) is close to this, we start at i°1 = i0 = 1. In themodel parents implicitly choose quality
investment in surviving children after the first five years of life. The value for d is picked to
(Soares, 2007).
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Preference Technology Disease Ecology
µ = 0.36 ∏= 2.85 µ= 1.5
Ø= (0.99)120 = 0.30 "= 0.12 a = 0.87
¡h = 1 ∫= 0.48 d = 0.28
¡u = 0.46 A = 10 ±= 0.85
∞= 1.13 Æ= 1/3
øu = øu = 0.15
Table 1: Parameter Values
be 0.28 so that i0d matches the child mortality rate of 0.28 (probability of dying between ages
0-5) in the UK between 1860° 69 (mortality.org).18 With ¡h = 1, we set ¡u = 0.46 to match
life expectancy (LE) at age 15 of 43.8 in the UK during the same period (mortality.org). In the
absence of information on the differential cost of raising sickly children, child rearing costs
(øh ,øu) are both set equal to 0.15 (Haveman and Wolf, 1995) which satisfies (A1). Since we do
not have resource cost of raising children this caps the fertility of a household of two parents at
a little above 13. For the quantity-quality tradeoff we set µ to 0.36 which, given the value for ∫
reported in Table 1, satisfies (A2). We set ∞ = 1.13 such that pre-transition TFR is 4.9 children
per woman, consistent with data for the UK.
For the human capital technology, since externalities can yield growth in human capital
even in the absence of quality investment when ∑ = 1, we set " so that there is no growth in
human capital (and output) per worker in this scenario. We set ∏= 2.85 so that post-transition
economic growth converges to 1% annual growth of GDP per worker, as in the case of the UK
(Broadberry and Klein, 2011). Then ∫ = 0.48 implies that post-transition TFR reaches replace-
ment level. For the aggregate technology, Æ is set to 1/3 and A normalized to 10.
Since the effects of µ and a are not separately identified in the model, we arbitrarily set
µ = 1.5 which requires a > 0.67 for µa > 1. We set a = 0.87 which ensures that (A4) is satisfied
and Figure 8(b) applies (pµa < 1). Themorbidity parameter ± is calibrated from evidence on la-
bor earnings. Recall thatmalaria is themain cause of childmortality in sub-SaharanAfrica. Cut-
ler et al. (2007) estimate thatmoving from themost to least malarious district in India raised in-
come ofmale workers by 3-13% though no effect on educational attainment is observed. Bleak-
ley (2010), on the other hand, finds malaria eradication affected both school attainment and
earnings in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the US. According to his estimates, income between
the least andmostmalarious regions differed by 12-40%, persistentmalarialmorbidity lowering
income by asmuch as 50%. Arguably early-life exposure tomalaria has a greater health effect in
18Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demo-
graphic Research (Germany). Downloaded from www.mortality.org in July, 2011.
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Africa than elsewhere. On the other hand, our model does not distinguish between chronically
and occasionally infected children andmorbidity from other infections like diarrhea could well
be smaller. Hence ± is best viewed as the average morbidity effect on all children who have sur-
vived various types of childhood infections. We set its value to 0.85. The implied earnings gap
of 8% between healthy and unhealthy workersmatches themid-point estimate of Cutler et al.19
6.2 The Historical Transition
An exogenous one-time change in child mortality causes a dynamic mortality transition in our
model. This happens because the incidence of infectious disease and mortality from it are en-
dogenous. Starting with an initial parameter vector (a0,d0)= (0.87,0.28) for an economy in the
Malthusian regime, consider two scenarios. In the first one – relevant for developed countries
(DC) that underwent demographic transitions in the nineteenth century – the economy expe-
riences an exogenous reduction in child mortality as the prevalence rate falls. Maintaining the
value of d , a large decline in a from a0 = 0.87 to a1 = 0.37 pushes i§ above 1 and a transition
towards full eradication begins as the economy switches from panel (b) to (c) in Figure 8.
The second scenario broadly replicates those less developed countries (LDC) where child
mortality fell in the twentieth century from a combination of lower prevalence and better cures.
These interventions could be different types of preventive and curative interventions, or those
that are primarily curative but also have an indirect effect in lowering prevalence. We choose
a new set of values (a1,d1) so that the immediate improvement in child survival is equal to
that in the first scenario. We lower a to a1 = 0.58, just enough to eliminate the full prevalence
steady state. The residual improvement in child survival is absorbed by the fatality rate falling to
d1 = 0.18. The combined effect also starts a transition towards full eradication, but at a slower
pace. The two scenarios differ only in how the mortality transition is triggered; the magni-
tude of the initial mortality shock is identical as are all parameter values besides a1 and d1. We
start both economies (DC and LDC) at (x0,k0)= (1,0.17), the steady-state values of human and
physical capital per worker in the pre-transition economy. Figure 9 illustrates the demographic,
epidemiological and economic responses.
The English transition began around 1872 and by 1950 child survival had improved to 96.5%,
LE at age 15 to 57 years, and the TFR had fallen to 2.1. The simulated DC transition matches
these trends closely. Within three generations (90 years), child survival is 96.7%, LE at age 15 is
56.6 years and TFR 2.1 per woman, the latter specifically targeted in our calibration. In contrast,
the LDC transition takes almost three times as long. Due to higher childhood morbidity in the
first few generations, the TFR is generally higher which causes a population explosion. During
19In the pre-transition economy where investment in human capital is nil, childhood infections matter only for
late-life mortality and ± is irrelevant.
27
the first forty years of the UK and SSA transitions, CMR fell by similar magnitudes (about 46%)
but TFR respondedmore strongly in the UK, an elasticity of 0.82 compared to 0.46 for SSA.20 By
construction child mortality initially falls by the same magnitude in the two cases reported in
Figure 9. The TFR response is stronger in the DC transition: its elasticity with respect to CMR
in the first period is 0.64 relative to 0.34 for the LDC transition. While this under-predicts the
fertility transition – presumably other factors also facilitated the transition – the relative speed
of the two regions is comparable to the data. Due to the slower transition, worker productivity
and GDP per worker are permanently lower in the LDC scenario.
Noninfectious diseasemortality among the elderly fluctuated around 40% in theUK prior to
the transition, began to decline in 1900, about one generation after infectious disease mortality
started to fall, and dropped to 9% by 1980 (Arora, 2005). Our simulations slightly over-predict
late-life mortality for the DC transition. The noninfectious mortality rate begins at 54% of the
elderly and, after lagging the infectious disease mortality decline as in the data, falls to 11% in
four generations or 120 years. In the LDC scenario, in contrast, noninfectious mortality falls
only to 38% four generations into the transition, about four times higher than the DC scenario
similar to the facts outlined in section 2.2.
The nature of the LDCmortality transition extracts a cost relative to the DC transition. Since
the prevalence rate initially falls by less, childhoodmorbidity and late-lifemortality remain high
several generations into the transition. This mutes the fertility response through the quantity-
quality and adult longevity margins.
6.3 The Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa
Beginning in the 1960s, child mortality improved in SSA from the availability of antibiotics, the
use of DDT in malaria eradication efforts and the establishment of the WHO which facilitated
technology transfer and public health campaigns. Later in the 1980s child vaccination further
loweredmortality. The LDC experiment above was inspired by this combination of prevalence-
and therapy-based efforts.
On two margins, however, SSA significantly differs from the UK: its pre-transition (1950-60)
CMR was actually lower than the UK’s (1850-70) while its pre-transition TFR was significantly
higher. It is plausible that even if SSA had benefited fromaprevalence-onlymortality reduction,
its transition to replacement fertility would have been slower. To identify how much slower
SSA’s experience has been relative to such a prevalence-only scenario, we recalibrate the model
to match SSA’s pre-transition levels of CMR and TFR and its observed fertility transition since
20This elasticity gap is larger than that for other developing regions. Outside SSA, the elasticity ranges from 0.69
for MENA to 0.81 for East Asia. Child mortality fell, however, by a larger magnitude in these regions relative to SSA
or the UK during comparable periods.
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the 1960s.
Compared to the UK benchmark, the parameter ∞ is adjusted to 2.69 to match the higher
pre-transition TFR in SSA which fluctuated around 6.6-6.7 during 1950-1960. We then set µ =
0.25 to maintain post-transition fertility at replacement level. To satisfy (A2) we also lower ∫
to 0.30. We lower the value of ± to 0.75 (earnings gap of 8% as before) in order to match the
slower rate of transition in SSA during 1960 - 2010 relative to the UK. In fact, SSA’s TFR barely
moved during the first thirty years of its CMR decline. The new values of ∫ and µ ensure that
quality investment is nil and fertility relatively high during the first generation of the transition.
The value for d is picked to be 0.25 so that i0d matches the mortality rate for children under
age 5 in SSA in 1960 (World Bank). To reflect lower pre-transition LE at age 15 in SSA of 40.2,
we set ¡u = 0.34. As in the UK experiment, there is no pre-transition growth in human capital
(and output) per worker, and post-transition economic growth converges to 1% annual growth
of GDP per worker. The remaining parameter values are as in Table 1.
We start with the initial configuration (a0,d0) = (0.87,0.25) for the pre-transition economy.
To simulate the SSA transition, child mortality falls due to a combination of exogenous reduc-
tion in prevalence and case fatalities. Specifically, a falls from 0.87 to 0.52 so that the economy
can start transitioning towards zero prevalence while d falls from 0.25 to 0.2. Together these
changes replicate the two-period (1950/60°2010) changes in CMR and TFR observed for SSA:
two generations after the mortality shock, TFR falls to just under 5 children per woman (Figure
10), similar to what we observe in the data (Figure 2).
The alternative scenario in Figure 10 shows what would have happened had the initial mor-
tality decline been solely from lower prevalence. Holding the case fatality rate constant at 0.25,
a declines from 0.87 to 0.41 to match the initial drop in CMR for SSA. Not surprisingly the de-
mographic transition would have progressed further by now with fertility significantly lower at
3.2, lagging MENA and South Asia by about a decade. At its current pace, SSA will reach that
level by 2040.
Life expectancy at birth rose in SSA from 41 to 54 years during 1960-2010 (World Devel-
opment Indicators), some of the progress undone by the HIV crisis since the late 1980s. In
comparison, life expectancy at age 15 changed little in the decades leading up to the HIV crisis,
from 40.2 years in 1975 to 41.2 years in 1980 to 40.6 years in 1990, falling to 38.3 years by 2000
due to the AIDS epidemic. The third panel of Figure 10 shows how life expectancy might have
improved with child survival in the absence of the AIDS epidemic, where ¡u has been chosen
to match LE at age 15 in SSA in 1975.21
21While the transition began earlier in SSA, data availability restricts us to 1975. If life expectancy at 15 responds
to CMR with a lag, then it would have been similar between 1950 and 1975.
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6.4 The Role of Morbidity
Several effects are at work in these experiments: how childhood morbidity affects human capi-
tal, how it affects adultmortality, and the dynamic path childmortality follows from a reduction
in the prevalence rate.
To clearly identify the role ofmorbidity, we construct “impulse responses”. Starting from full
disease prevalence and 28% case fatalities (CMR of 28% as in the UK experiment), we hold the
prevalence rate at a level where an exogenous reduction in i does not tip the economy towards
zero prevalence. This switches off the dynamic response due to changing prevalence rates. We
then compare the growth effects of a reduction in childmortality due to an exogenous reduction
in case fatalities from 28% to 18% versus the same decrease when the prevalence rate falls to
64%. In the two cases, the initial increase in life expectancy at birth is identical.
Figure 11 plots the annualized growth rate of GDP per capita for the i -decline and d-decline
scenarios when ± = 0.85 (UK experiment) and ± = 1 (no scarring effect). To maintain positive
human capital investment in each of the following experiments, µ is lowered to 0.35. Parameter
values are otherwise identical to the UK experiment. The initial increase in life expectancy at
birth is 1.5 years, from 54.6 to 56.1. In Figure 11 economic growth is permanently faster in the
i -decline scenario when ±< 1 (left panel), because the NFR declines and human capital invest-
ment in each child increases, while in the d-decline scenario these remain unchanged. For the
±= 1 case, the difference in growth rates between the i -decline and d-decline scenarios is tem-
porary and results from old-age mortality differences. Since ¡u < ¡h = 1, children who suffer
from infections grow up predisposed towards non-infectious disease in old age. These indi-
viduals save less of their income and have more children, thereby slowing human and physical
capital accumulation.
To isolate the effect of childhood morbidity we next set ¡u = ¡h = 1. Childhood infections
now affect fertility through the quantity-quality margin alone. Initially life expectancy at birth
rises by 1.5 years, from 70.8 to 72.3. As in the previous case, a permanent growth gap opens up
between the two cases when ±< 1 (Figure 11, right panel). If ±= 1, all children whether infected
or not grow up to be healthy, so fertility, quality investment and saving decisions are identical
in the two economies. The long-run growth effects are identical in the two panels because only
childhood morbidity affects human capital accumulation, the engine of growth in this model.
Of course, as we have shown earlier, if both economies were to converge to zero prevalence in
the long run, eventually growth rates will converge but income levels will not.22 In fact for ±< 1
the resulting income gap would be even greater because morbidity persists in the d-decline
scenario.
22In Figure 11, a lagged response occurs because lower morbidity translates into higher physical and human
capital among the following generation of working-age adults.
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When i = 1, all surviving children are unhealthy and a decline in d does not change this.
When i < 1, some surviving children are healthy while others are unhealthy, so a decline in d
raises the proportion of unhealthy children relative to healthy ones. When i = 1 human capital
investment per child and the NFR are unaffected by changes in d , but if initial i < 1, then a
reduction in the case fatality rate generates an increase in the NFR and a decrease in human
capital investment as long as ± < 1. We illustrate this scenario by starting with i = 0.9 and d =
0.31 so that initial CMR = 28%, the same as before. We then compare the growth effects when
case fatalities decline from 31% to 20% versus the same decrease in child mortality from the
prevalence falling from 90% to 58%. CMR falls from 28% to 18% in all of the scenarios in Figure
11, but economic growth decreases initially only in the d-decline scenario when initial i < 1.
For ±= 1 growth dips initially with the d-decline only if ¡u <¡h due to the longevity effect. For
± < 1 the longevity effect contributes to the dip in growth when ¡u < ¡h , while human capital
investment declines with a fall in d regardless of the values for ¡u and ¡h .
We conclude thatwhen childhood infections have a scarring effect, a reduction in childmor-
tality (or increase in life expectancy at birth) does not increase economic growth unless child-
hood morbidity also falls, as in the i -decline scenario. Indeed, the d-decline scenario shows
that growthmay temporarily fall when reductions in childmortality dilute average child quality
and increase fertility.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that the morbidity effect of infectious disease is an important element of de-
mographic and epidemiological changes in the long run. We constructed a dynastic model
of endogenous mortality and fertility where childhood infections depreciate child quality and
predispose people towards non-infectious disease in late life. A calibrated version of the model
is able to explain why sub-Saharan Africa’s mortality transition has not generated the kind of
fertility, epidemiological and economic responses that we have seen historically or in other de-
veloping regions.
Mortality, particularly among children, has been widely used as a parsimonious metric of
economic development. A notable implication of our analysis is that child mortality (or life
expectancy at birth) is a weak proxy of a population’s underlying health since mortality and
morbidity do not always move in the same direction, a point made earlier by Murray and Chen
(1992). Higher life expectancy at birth facilitates a fertility transition and economic develop-
ment only when accompanied by lower childhoodmorbidity and adult mortality.
In a promising development, some African countries have recently reduced infant and child
mortality through prevalence efforts. Kenya’s infant mortality rate fell from 8.1 to 6.0% between
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2003 and 2008-09 driven wholly by reductions in postneonatal mortality. This was made possi-
ble by new public health efforts targeting the transmission of infectious diseases, for instance
increased usage of insecticide-sprayed bednets and better access to clean water and sanitation
(Demombynes and Trommlerova, 2012). In our view, replicating this experience across the con-
tinent would facilitate sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic and epidemiological transitions and
contribute to its economic development.
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